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As the ease of prenatal genetic testing increases alongside an increase in the number and 
variety of conditions testable, so does the general view, both in medical and social communities, 
that prenatal testing is a logical extension of good prenatal care with the goal of healthy babies.  
Presently though, prospective parents use positive prenatal test results primarily as the basis of a 
decision to abort fetuses that carry mutations associated with disease and/or disability.  For many 
this is not simply a logical extension of the idea of good prenatal care.1 The disability rights 
movement thereby suggests that we need to question the consequences of reproductive 
technologies and abortion policies for everyone with a disability.2 The issue must be viewed in 
light of the history of our society’s treatment of people with disabilities, according to which the 
disability rights movement regards such testing as potentially dangerous.  This disability critique 
proceeds from the view that discrimination results when people in one group fail to imagine that 
people in some other group lead lives as rich and complex as their own and holds that the desire 
of prospective parents to avoid raising children with disabilities may depend on that failure.3
Though “[p]eople who make policy concerning the dissemination of genetic information have 
reached a consensus that the purpose of prenatal testing is to enhance reproductive choice for 
women and families – not to decrease the number of children with disabilities who are born”, 
there is a definite tension between the goals of enhancing reproductive choice and preventing the 
births of children who would have disabilities.4
The disability critique proposes that selective abortion after prenatal diagnosis is morally 
problematic as it expresses negative or discriminatory attitudes, not merely about a disabling trait, 
but about those who carry it.  This argument is called the expressivist argument.  In what follows 
I hope to demonstrate the validity and applicability of this argument against the critiques of James 
Lindemann Nelson, as well as its foundations in and growth out of the view of disability as 
partially and detrimentally socially constructed.  I will also summarize the parallel argument that 
the majority’s view of disability is based on misinformation and that it is this misinformation that 
is the driving force for much of selective abortion after prenatal diagnosis.  Central to this 
argument is the idea that living with disabling traits need not be detrimental either to an 
individual’s prospects of leading a worthwhile life, to their families, or to society as a whole.  In 
laying out these arguments I am not attempting to argue for a decisive threshold position 
regarding public policy or to express specific clear-cut practical conclusions regarding the topic; 
rather I hope to accurately and convincingly propose a view that should be acknowledged, and 
hopefully considered, concerning a decision of selective abortion. 
The central claim of the expressionist argument, as stated by Adrienne Asch, is that the 
use of prenatal testing to select against disabling traits expresses a hurtful attitude about, and 
sends a hurtful message to, people who live with those same traits.5 Moreover, prenatal testing 
repeats and reinforces the same tendency toward letting the part, i.e., a single trait, stand in for the 
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whole that many people with disabilities experience daily.6 That knowledge of a single trait is 
enough to warrant the abortion of an otherwise wanted fetus suggests that people are reducible to 
a single perceived-to-be-undesirable trait.7 In other words, the expressivist argument suggests 
that the greatest insult to people with disabilities, that some people are too flawed in their very 
DNA to exist, that they are unworthy of being born, lies at the heart of selective abortion.  In 
Marsha Saxton’s own words: 
 
[F]ighting for this issue, our right and worthiness to be born, is the 
fundamental challenge to disability oppression; it underpins our most 
basic claim to justice and equality – we are indeed worthy of being born, 
worth the help and expense, and we know it!8
Susan Wendell adds, along with her advocation of the expressivist argument, not only 
that employing selective abortion to reduce the number of people born with disabilities sends a 
disparaging message to people with disabilities, but also that it strengthens the widely-held belief 
that life with a disability is not worth living, it might weaken efforts to increase accessibility and 
opportunities for people with disabilities (in appearing to reduce the social problems of people 
with disabilities by reducing the number of people with disabilities), and it could lead to even 
greater reluctance to commit resources to the medical treatment that makes the lives of people 
with incurable conditions more comfortable and rewarding.9 (While these are only empirical 
speculations, they are probable in light of our society’s current treatment of people with 
disabilities.) 
One of the central lessons urged by the disability rights movement is that much of the 
concept of disability is socially constructed.  Disability cannot be defined purely in biomedical 
terms, as both biological and social aspects are interactive in creating and preventing it, just as 
feminist theorists hold that our idea of gender is largely socially constructed.  The expressivist 
argument has this view at its foundations.  Through an examination of the socially constructed 
aspects of disability (here, specifically in the writings of Susan Wendell in her The Rejected 
Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections on Disability), the applicability of the expressivist 
argument is made much more apparent. 
To begin, it becomes immediately clear when an attempt is made to come up with an 
adequate definition of disability that societal influence must be acknowledged.  For example, 
even the United Nations’ definitions of impairment, disability and handicap explicitly recognize 
the possibility that the primary causes of a disabled person’s inability to do certain things may be 
social.10 Any standard of ‘normal’ structure, function and ability to perform an activity must 
depend to some degree on the society in which the standards of normality are generated.  For 
example, in less technological societies, more people are considered disabled since the standards 
for normal ability and function are necessarily higher.11 And when increases in the accepted 
pace of life in a society occur, there is a tendency for more people to become disabled, not only 
because of the physically damaging consequences of efforts to move faster, but also because 
fewer people can meet the expectations of ‘normal’ performance.12 When a society provides few 
resources to allow people with disabilities to participate in its activities, all people with 
disabilities are marginalized, including the elderly.  (Though many would not consider being 
elderly as a disability, most societies accordingly make it so.)  Thereby in defining the 
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appropriate roles of older people as very limited, societies disadvantage them.13 Similarly, in 
societies where a ‘normal’ woman is expected to lack strength, skills and range of movement, 
fewer women will be considered disabled (and more disability will go unrecognized) than in a 
society that does not hold these lower expectations for women.  Or in other sexist societies, lack 
of opportunities and encouragement for women to develop bodily abilities, as well as constant 
objectification, threaten to deprive many women in these societies of their full physical potential. 
14 Also, many social factors, such as high-risk working conditions, the abuse and neglect of 
children, and low public safety standards (to name just a few), which can damage people’s 
bodies in ways that are disabling in their environments, “almost always affect some groups in a 
society more than others because of racism, sexism, heterosexism, ageism, and advantages of 
class background, wealth, and education.”15 Accordingly, an appeal to biomedical typicality 
won’t work for an attempted definition of disability, for even basic ‘normal’ abilities are relative 
to the environment in which they are performed.  Further, the belief that ‘the disabled’ is merely 
a biological category masks the social functions and injustices that underlie the assignment of 
people to these groups. 
For this reason, Susan Wendell proposes that any good definition of disability should 
recognize that normal physical structure and function, as well as normal ability to perform 
activities, depend, to some extent at least, on the physical, social, and cultural environment in 
which a person is living and are influenced by factors such as what activities are necessary to 
survival in that particular environment and what abilities that culture considers most essential.16 
It would thus recognize that disability is contextual, i.e., in a given situation ‘disability’ is often 
created by the inability or unwillingness of others to adapt themselves or the environment to the 
physical or psychological reality of the person designated as ‘disabled’, while, at the same time, 
people with disabilities often regard their accommodations as ordinary, despite most people’s 
insistence that they are unusually helpless or dependent.17 In this way, disability cannot be 
defined purely in biomedical terms, because social arrangements and expectations make essential 
contributions to disability and its absence. 
Wendell’s view of the social construction of disability can be divided into three general 
aspects, all of which are easy to recognize.  First, social conditions, such as the availability of 
basic resources, the quality of medical care and practice, and the quality of one’s living and 
working environment, affect people’s bodies by creating or failing to prevent sickness and 
injury.18 Second, the assumed norm for pace of life in the social organization and physical 
structure of a society can marginalize people with disabilities, through its idealized expectations 
of performance: 
 
Societies that are physically constructed and socially organized with the unacknowledged 
assumption that everyone is healthy, non-disabled, young but adult, shaped according to 
cultural ideals, and, often, male, create a great deal of disability through sheer neglect of 
what most people need in order to participate fully in them.19 
In this way, disability is created even for those in a society who are not considered biologically 
disabled, such as pregnant women, parents with strollers, children, large people and the elderly.  
Third, disability is also socially constructed by the failure to give people the amount and kind of 
help they need to participate fully in all major aspects of life in a society, “the failure or 
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unwillingness to create ability among people who do not fit the physical and mental profile of 
‘paradigm’ citizens.”20 Wendell is thereby not implying that social factors alone cause disability, 
rather that the social response to, and treatment of, biological difference (this idea will be further 
explored below) constructs disability from biological reality, determining both the nature and the 
severity of disability.21 This social response can be seen as a result of the problematic cultural 
habit of regarding the condition of a person, not the built environment or the social organization 
of activities, as the source of the problem of disability.  This leads to the self-perpetuation of the 
social system’s construction of disability.  In light of this view of the social construction of 
disability, the relevance of the expressivist argument becomes more apparent, as prenatal 
diagnosis followed by selective abortion can be viewed as reinforcing the medical model that 
disability itself, not societal discrimination against people with disabilities, is the problem to be 
solved. 
In his article, “Prenatal Diagnosis, Personal Identity, and Disability,” James Lindemann 
Nelson argues that the expressivist argument is inadequate for three reasons, 1) that, considered 
as a practice, abortions prompted by prenatal testing are “not semantically well-behaved enough 
to send any particular message,” for they do not function as signs in a rule-governed symbol 
system, 2) that, even granting the expressive power of testing and aborting, it would not be 
possible to distinguish between abortions undertaken because of beliefs about the potential 
disabling conditions of the future child and abortions undertaken for many other possible reasons, 
and 3) that the argument cannot, in general, distinguish successfully between abortion and gene 
therapy as responses to disability.22
Nelson introduces his first criticism with Allen Buchanan’s argument that the claim that 
an action conveys a meaning is only correct when the agents involved meet two conditions.  The 
first concerns the content of an agent’s beliefs: for an action to convey a certain meaning, he or 
she must hold the beliefs purportedly expressed by that action; the second is that those beliefs 
must play a certain role in the decision making, i.e., the agent’s decision either must be 
motivated by beliefs that disparage people with disabilities or cannot be a rational decision 
absent of the acceptance of such convictions.  Nelson proposes that the case of selective abortion 
does not fit these conditions.23 I believe he is wrong in the vast majority of cases.  Though in 
particular cases the testing and termination of pregnancy can be considered rational without the 
attribution of such beliefs to the parent/s (as will be discussed below), generally, because of the 
numerous socially constructed aspects of disability, and particularly the common negative and 
misinformed stereotypes of people with disabilities (as will also be further discussed below), 
most people do, usually ignorantly, hold disparaging beliefs toward people with disabilities, 
which would most likely be the primary motivational force behind the decision to abort a 
potentially disabled fetus. 
Nelson then suggests, though, that perhaps this argument rests on a conception of 
meaning that is too closely tied to the beliefs that people hold as they act.  Accordingly he 
proposes that it is not so much the intentions of agents that do not send a disparaging message to 
people, rather that as social institutions, prenatal testing and selective abortion are “not governed 
by the kinds of rules that would be required to assign them a role in a symbol system.”24 He 
summarizes Wittgenstein in saying that for some behavior to have semantic significance it must 
have a rule-governed role in publicly sharable system of symbols.  Concerning language 
specifically, Wittgenstein believes that meaning something can be best conceived in terms of the 
sorts of counterfactuals that provide the criteria for judging whether a sign is meant in a certain 
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way.25 By ‘rule following’, though, Wittgenstein is not referring to what explains a practice, 
rather the actual behavior of overtly using signs or symbols.26 In this way, the existence of 
meaning requires the repeated use of rules, for our conception of grasping a rule at a particular 
time essentially involves the idea of applications of the rule over time.  This is where 
Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘custom’ arises: “[A] person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there 
exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom”; “I have been trained to react to this sign in a 
particular way, and now I do so react to it.”27 
Accordingly, as Nelson suggests, I agree that the hanging of a state or national flag 
would qualify as an established symbol according to such a system or custom.  The standard job 
of hanging a flag at a capitol, for instance, is not merely to denote the state, but to express 
messages concerning a polity’s history and values.28 But I disagree that as a social institution, 
prenatal screening followed by selective abortion does not have a similarly established role.  As 
already demonstrated, ‘disability’ does actually have such a commonly acknowledged role in a 
publicly sharable system of symbols, which is what continues the (now “politically correct”) 
discrimination of people with disabilities.  I believe it follows that selective abortion in order to 
avoid disability, with the foundation of this socially constructed negative symbol of disability, 
also has such an established symbolic role.  Therefore, selective abortion of prenatally diagnosed 
fetuses is capable of sending disparaging messages to people with disabilities. 
Nelson’s second criticism of the expressivist argument considers how it isolates a feature 
of selective abortion that distinguishes it as morally problematic from other assumed morally 
unproblematic abortions.  He argues that abortion on the basis of, e.g., family size or poverty 
should also, according to the expressivist argument, send similarly disparaging messages to 
children and adults of large families or the poor.29 Allowing that this would be an unfortunate, 
although unlikely, possibility, I believe it is irrelevant.  The expressivist argument holds not only 
that disability involves socially constructed aspects leading to discrimination, but also that 
selective abortion on the basis of potential disability is a specific class of abortions, which 
involves a qualitative assessment of the particular inherent traits that are the biological aspects of 
disabilities.  It is the subjective, as opposed to objective, rejection of a specific type of person, 
the rejection of a particular fetus, as opposed to the rejection of any fetus that happens to be 
potentially born into a particular objective situation (though that situation may still be socially 
constructed).  When women abort for reasons of family size or income or their own health, etc., 
there is no similar change of mind involved as in selective abortion – they never wanted the fetus 
to become a child in the first place.30 This idea of the importance of particularity is argued by 
Marsha Saxton’s belief that with prenatal diagnosis, as more generally with discrimination, a 
single trait stands in for the whole potential person and obliterates it.  This tendency suggests 
that people are reducible to a single, perceived-to-be-undesirable, inherent trait.  And 
accordingly, it sends the greatest insult to people with disabilities, that they are too flawed in 
their very chromosomal makeup to exist, to be worthy of being born.31 
Important here is the view that merely the knowledge of a single trait is enough to 
warrant the abortion of an otherwise wanted fetus.  Though this would be the case in such a 
situation as a disabled fetus being aborted because caring for a disabled child would impoverish 
the family, I believe that in such a circumstance, the expressivist argument would not hold for 
there is another central contributing factor to the decision of selective abortion, i.e., poverty.  If, 
as I am assuming, the parents would not abort the fetus if they had more resources, the fetus is 
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directly being rejected due to poverty, and only indirectly due to the potential disability.  (I do 
believe, though, that this is a different and serious problem.  I agree with Susan Wendell that 
adequate resources and accommodations should be provided to people with disabilities and their 
families in order to allow them to lead a fulfilling life, as they are capable of doing, with respect 
to the major aspects of life in a particular society.)32 Further, Nelson claims that many women 
who accept prenatal testing are at least somewhat ambiguous about continuing their pregnancies 
right from the start.  I believe, though, that if they go through the effort of prenatal testing, this 
can only be construed as a result of their negative preconceptions of disability (misinformed or 
not) and its potential effects on them and the future child. 
Nelson also argues that the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is not relevant and that it “runs 
counter to” the disability rights movement’s central claim that disabilities are, in a very 
important measure, socially constructed.33 As I already argued, I believe that it is, on the 
contrary, quite relevant.  I also believe that it actually fits well with the social construction view.  
This view does not neglect the inherent biological aspects of particular disabilities; rather it 
claims that much of the negative and detrimental stereotyping of people with disabilities results 
from limiting societal arrangements and common misunderstandings.  The choice and 
implementation of selective abortion does include the rejection of a particular fetus on the basis 
of an inherent genetic mutation.  But it is also heavily swayed by the societal view of the 
influence of that particular trait on the life of the potential individual and his/her caregivers.  For 
example, prenatal testing will diagnose a third copy of chromosome 21, but that fetus will 
generally, if it is rejected, be rejected as a result of how the parent/s view Down’s Syndrome.
Though I acknowledge that poverty is also similarly socially constructed, the important point for 
the expressivist argument is the problematic circumstantial duality surrounding prenatal 
screening followed by selective abortion.  Not only does it involve the rejection of a particular 
fetus, but it also has an established symbolic role in society, i.e. the discrimination of people with 
disabilities. 
In his third and final critique of the expressivist argument, Nelson claims that, if 
expressivistic considerations pertain to abortion, they must also pertain to efforts to avoid the 
conception of a fetus facing such probabilities, or to therapeutic responses, i.e., gene therapy, 
that might eliminate the conditions that may result in the disability.  He goes to great lengths to 
explain that the identity of the potentially disabled individual is eliminated by therapy, just as 
s/he would need to support a view that abortion in itself was morally problematic.34 But, to 
begin, the expressivist argument is not applicable to the use of preventative measures prior to or 
during pregnancy, such as eating healthy, taking vitamins, and not smoking or drinking, as 
Nelson claims, because in employing them, a particular potential individual is not being rejected.  
And the heart of the expressivist argument, i.e., the potential discrimination, lies in this 
particularity of the rejection.  And secondly, concerning gene therapy, I completely agree with 
Nelson and believe that others who advance the expressivist argument would as well, that there 
is no difference between selective abortion and gene therapy, regarding the applicability of the 
expressivist argument.  Thus, as Nelson gives no reference to any objection to the view that gene 
therapy is just as problematic as selective abortion in the ‘disability community,’ he seems to be 
outright assuming that its members would hold the contrary in direct contradiction with some of 
its central propositions.  Regardless, this critique is still Nelson’s strongest, and it stipulates 
further analysis.  To conclude on the topic of Nelson’s critique of the expressivist argument, I 
hope to have responded adequately in order to more thoroughly show the relevance of the 
expressivist argument against selective abortion as a valid consideration. 
 
32 Wendell, p.55-6. 
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Before concluding, I wish to quickly summarize an argument parallel to the expressivist 
argument, as it runs hand-in-hand with it.  The argument that prenatal genetic testing followed 
by selective abortion is driven by misinformation holds that it depends on a misunderstanding of 
what life with a disability is like for children with disabilities and their families: “if prospective 
parents could see that families with children who have disabilities fare much better than the myth 
would have it, [they] would be less enthusiastic about the technology.”35 This argument also has 
its foundations in the view of the partial social construction of disability.  According to Wendell, 
there is a lack of realistic cultural representations of people with disabilities, and as a result there 
is a widespread fear of being disabled, which is exacerbated by the assumption that disability 
means exclusion from the major aspects of a social life, such that life as a ‘disabled person’ is 
not worth living.36 Such widespread ignorance and fear contribute to the desire to prevent 
disability by preventing difference (i.e., by means of selective abortion) from the ‘norms’ of 
society.37 In this way, the common but inadequate understanding of what diagnoses of particular 
disabilities actually mean and of the quality of life of people with those disabilities puts the 
welfare, security and social acceptance of people with disabilities in jeopardy.38
Still, though, it must be acknowledged that there is a plurality of disabling traits in 
addition to the plurality of attitudes toward prenatal diagnosis.  For example, there are multiple 
genetic disorders that guarantee the death of an afflicted child by a very early age.  Most parents 
would understandably like to spare themselves the experience of bearing a child who will soon 
die, beyond, of course, sparing the child of such pain and suffering.  In cases such as these, 
though, I believe the expressivist argument would actually be by definition irrelevant, for no 
possible discrimination would result.  In such cases, when carrier risk is known, novel 
reproductive technology even allows for preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), in which in 
vitro fertilized eggs can be diagnosed prior to their implantation into the mother.  Such in vitro 
screening and choice implantation is justified, I believe, when parental carrier risk for early fatal 
disorders, such as Tay-Sachs Disease or Trisomy 18, are identified (most likely due to a prior 
afflicted child).  At the same time, though, I believe the expressivist argument holds against PGD 
beyond such extraordinary circumstances, for it still consists in the rejection of an embryo on the 
basis of a single, particular, inherent trait.  Further, for certain individuals who posses different 
characters and aptitudes, the overall experience of raising even a non-fatally disabled child could 
be negative – they may be making an honest and informed acceptance of their own character and 
goals in deciding to abort a prenatally diagnosed fetus.39 
It is at this point that it must be remembered that both of the above arguments of the 
disability rights movement are not intended to justify absolute restrictions on prenatal testing for 
genetic disability.  Instead, they are intended to make prospective parents pause and think about 
their choices and decisions, and to challenge professionals to help parents better examine the 
reality of their options and not simplify the facts; “[t]hey are intended to help make our decisions 
thoughtful and informed not thoughtless and automatic.”40 In other words, though there is in 
general a powerful reason for not aborting a child on the grounds of prenatally diagnosed 
potential disability, the issue is complex, involving many more and important aspects beyond the 
potential discrimination of people with disabilities.  Specifics of the disorder as well as familial 
circumstances must be addressed.  It is for this reason that I qualified above that I am not 
attempting to argue for a decisive threshold position regarding public policy or to express 
specific clear-cut practical conclusions, rather I hope to be accurately and convincingly 
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proposing a view that should be acknowledged, and hopefully considered, concerning a decision 
of selective abortion. 
In conclusion, I have summarized the two primary arguments of the disability rights 
movement against prenatal genetic testing followed by selective abortion, that it is morally 
problematic (the expressivist argument) and that it is driven by misinformation.  I hope to have 
demonstrated in doing so, in showing both arguments’ foundations in the view of disability as 
partially but detrimentally socially constructed, and in responding to Nelson’s critiques of the 
expressivist argument, the validity, relevance and applicability of these arguments for the social 
well-being and the cultural bettering of society as a whole. 
To reiterate, I find it ironic that the social factors that contribute to the seriousness of and 
suffering associated with any disorder or disease are often overlooked, while it can be argued 
that “the ‘tragedy’ and ‘suffering’ of ‘the disabled’ result primarily from the isolation of disabled 
people in society.”41 A stereotyped vision of people with disabilities is often held by prospective 
parents undergoing prenatal diagnosis and considering selective abortion and is often fueled by 
their lack of exposure to people with disabilities.  “Families with a disabled child, however, learn 
to appreciate the richness of their child’s life, and to recognize how much quality of life depends 
on social support” – “it is discriminatory attitudes that make raising a disabled child much more 
difficult than the actual logistics of his or her unique care.”42 Further, there will always be adults 
and children with disabilities due to reasons not preventable by genetic technological means.  
Therefore it is important to consider that not only does the widespread use of selective abortion 
to reduce the number of people born with disabilities send a message of rejection to children and 
adults with disabilities, that they are not valued and do not really belong, but it also strengthens 
the common belief that life with a disability is not worth living (ignoring that social 
improvements could make life with a disability much more worth living than it is now), could 
weaken efforts to increase accessibility and opportunities for people with disabilities, and could 
lead to even greater reluctance to commit resources to medical treatment of people with 
incurable conditions.  Finally I agree with Susan Wendell’s worries that the screening of fetuses 
and selective abortion, though they began as voluntary medical procedures, could fairly quickly 
become culturally mandatory, which could lead to the potential blaming of women if they do not 
undergo all the available medical procedures, and could also lead to increased tolerance of 
eugenic policies in general and expansion of eugenic efforts into other areas, a particular danger 
in our societies that are already engrained with cultural myths of control and perfection of the 
body.43 
41 Saxton, Marsha, (commentary) Hastings Center Report, 1996, 26(3): 22. 
42 Op. cit., p.22. 
43 Wendell, p.153-6. 

